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Equity Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China:
Problems That Continue After More Than a Decade Under
the Open Door Policy*
Margaret L.H. prfg**
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, the People's Republic of China ("China") officially opened its
doors to foreign investment. This "open door policy" was initiated by
the enactment of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment ("Joint Venture Law") I
which provides for foreign investment in China through equity joint ven-
tures between Chinese partners and foreign investors.2
However, it was obvious from the outset of China's open door policy
that the goals of the statutorily-mandated partners to a joint venture, the
Chinese partner and the foreign investor, were diametrically opposed.
On the one hand, the goal of China's open door policy was to invigorate
its domestic economy by increasing capital investment and raising the
level of managerial skills and technology in China, with a view to in-
creasing exports and earning foreign exchange.' In other words, China
hoped to develop export markets. Foreign investors, on the other hand,
viewed China as the world's largest potential consumer market and as a
cheap source of labor and raw materials.4 Mainly, foreign investors
hoped to develop domestic markets. From these conflicting goals, it was
clear that problems in foreign investment were inevitable.
Other problems arose out of the differences between China's cen-
trally planned economy and the market economies of most foreign inves-
* This article was written in early 1991 and does not reflect the most recent developments in
the PRC to date.
** Associate, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Washington, D.C., G.C.E. 'A' Level, Singa-
pore Catholic Junior College; LL.B. (with Honors), National University of Singapore; LL.M. (Inter-
national and Comparative Law), Georgetown University. Member, New York and Singapore Bar.
I The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment (Promulgated by the People's National Congress on July 8, 1979) (LEXIS, Asiapc li-
brary, Chinal file) [hereinafter Joint Venture Law].
2 Id. art. 1.
3 See Andrew Quinn, China's Top Economist Calls for Radical Reform, REUTERS, Mar. 24,
1992 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Reuters file).
4 See Walter A. Taylor, China's Lures for Western Know-How, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 10, 1984, at 82.
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tors. For example, after thirty years of isolation and central government
planning, China's workers, managers, planners, and government officials
undoubtably carried their experience over into the new era of joint ven-
tures. As a result, wide disparities in business concepts between a
planned economy and a Western market economy soon emerged.
Despite the potential problems of investing in China, 3,248 direct
foreign investment projects with an aggregate value of $8.990 billion5
were established in China from 1979 to 1984.6 The total number of
projects rose to 21,734 in 1989, and the aggregate value rose to $32.356
billion.7
Although there was no legislation governing cooperative joint ven-
tures,8 this form of foreign investment was popular in China during the
early 1980's because it offered greater flexibility than equity joint ven-
tures.9 However, over time, it became clear that cooperative joint ven-
tures were losing their attraction. 10 One reason for this may be that
foreign investors felt more comfortable with equity joint ventures because
they were governed by a defined body of law and offered limited liability
whereas cooperative joint ventures did not. In response to this, the Chi-
nese government finally adopted a law for cooperative joint ventures in
1988.11 Even with this new law, limited liability was not accorded to
cooperative joint ventures. This may be the reason why equity joint ven-
tures have remained the favored vehicle for foreign investment in China
in recent years. 12
This article will discuss the problems commonly encountered by for-
eign investors operating in China who are participants in equity joint
ventures ("joint ventures")."3 This discussion will center around the reg-
ulations that apply to these problems and will be made in the context of
5 All amounts recorded in "dollars" refer to U.S. dollars.
6 A Breakdown of Foreign Investment in China, Contracted and Utilized, 16 Bus. CHINA 192
(1990).
7 Id.
8 The first Chinese legislation on foreign investment only governs equity joint ventures. See
generally Joint Venture Law, supra note 1.
9 See A Breakdown of Foreign Investment in China, Contracted and Utilized, supra note 6 (for
example, from 1979 through 1984, 2,212 cooperative joint ventures were established compared to
931 equity joint ventures).
10 By 1989, there were 12,198 equity joint ventures compared to 7,994 cooperative joint ven-
tures. Id.
II See Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures
(adopted by the First Session of the Seventy National People's Congress on April 13, 1988) (LEXIS,
Asiapc library, Chinal file).
12 For example, in 1989, 56% of foreign investment projects in China were equity joint ven-
tures. A Breakdown of Foreign Investment in China, Contracted and Utilized, supra note 6.
13 A joint venture had a term of ten through thirty years. In 1986, the maximum term was
extended to 50 years with the possibility of longer terms subject to the approval of the state council.
In 1990, the fixed-term requirement was abolished. Id.
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the experience of various joint ventures who have encountered these
problems.
II. FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROBLEMS
In the mid-1980's, observers generally listed shortage of foreign ex-
change,14 difficulties in local sourcing," difficulties in labor manage-
ment, 1 6 inadequate infrastructure, 7  and poor quality control 8  as
common problems encountered in the operation of joint ventures in
China.' 9 According to one survey, the same problems continue to plague
foreign investments in 198920 despite Chinese legislation enacted between
1985 and 1989. The continued prevalence of these problems suggests
that legislation may not be the solution.
A. Shortage of Foreign Exchange
The Implementing Act for the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment ("Im-
plementing Act")21 requires that joint ventures balance their foreign ex-
change receipts and expenditures.22 Because the Chinese currency
renminbi is not freely convertible into foreign exchange, joint ventures
must generate enough hard currency to pay for imported materials and
the repatriation of profits belonging to the foreign partner.23 If they can-
not, joint ventures must then find some means of converting their
renminbi earnings into foreign exchange.24
However, the task of balancing the foreign exchange account has
proven to be a major problem for many foreign investment enterprises in
China.25 For example, according to the National Council for U.S.-China
14 Fenwick, Equity Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: An Assessment of the First
Five Years, 40 Bus LAW 839 (1985).
15 Id. at 842.
16 Ida at 846; See also, Walter S. Surrey et al, Joint Ventures in China: The First Water Stop, 21
TEX. INT'L L. J. 222, 251 (1986).
17 Fenwick, supra note 14, at 842.
18 Cecilia L. Wagner, A Survey of Sino-American Joint Ventures: Problems and Outlook for
Solutions, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Mar. 1990, at 7.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 9.
21 Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the Peoples Republic of China on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, art. 100 (promulgated by the State Council on
Sept. 20, 1983) (LEXIS, Asiapc library, Chinal file) [hereinafter Implementing Act].
22 Id art. 75.
23 NIGEL CAMPBELL, A STRATEGIc GUIDE TO EQUITY JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA 67
(1989).
24 Id.
25 On the other hand, hotel and tourist service joint ventures are spared from this plight be-
cause they provide accommodations and services to foreigners who pay in hard currency.
1992]
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Trade, in 1988 only about 1,300 out of a total of 4,000 foreign investment
enterprises were able to balance their foreign exchange income and
expenditures.
The two major reasons for the imbalance in foreign exchange ac-
counts are: (1) the heavy reliance on imported materials to produce the
joint venture product (too much foreign currency going out of China);
and (2) the inability to export in sufficient quantities to generate the req-
uisite foreign exchange income (not enough foreign currency coming into
China). For example, joint ventures often have to rely on imported
materials because the materials are not available in China.2 6 If the
materials are available, they are often not of adequate quality.2 7 Even if
the materials are of sufficient quality, there is often not enough quantity
to meet the needs of the joint venture.28 When exporting, joint ventures
often have difficulty marketing their products because the products are
either too expensive or fail to meet the standards of international
markets.29
AMC-Beijing, the first Sino-U.S. automotive joint venture, is a
widely publicized example of a joint venture's foreign exchange di-
lemma.30 In the spring of 1986, AMC was caught in a Chinese govern-
ment clampdown on foreign exchange.31 Ninety per cent of each Jeep
Cherokee produced by AMC-Beijing was as built from imported $12,000
component kits.32 These kits had to be paid for in foreign currency.33
Since AMC-Beijing did not generate enough foreign exchange to pay for
the imports, it purchased hard currency from the Chinese government.34
However, in 1986 the Chinese government restricted all foreign exchange
purchases35 and specifically refused to sell foreign currency to the joint
venture.3 6 The joint venture was therefore unable to pay for the im-
ported components.37
By the time the Chinese government decided to meet AMC's de-
mands, it was clear that the confidence of foreign investors was damaged.
26 See infra section IIB(1).
27 See infra section IIB(2).
28 See infra section IIB(1).
29 See infra section IIE.
30 See John F. Bums, AMC's Troubles in China, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1986, at DI, D4; Clare,
Joint Venturing in China: The AMC Experience, E. AsIAN EXEC. REP., Nov. 1986, at 7.




35 Id. In 1985 China's foreign exchange reserves dropped by more than $5 billion, to just
under $11 billion. This drop was due to overspending on imports and the government reacted by
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For example, the AMC-Beijing venture, one of the largest American
manufacturing joint ventures in China, was closely watched by other
American investors as an indicator of how their own investments in
China would fare.3" The Chinese government's handling of AMC-Bei-
jing's foreign exchange purchases further eroded the confidence of for-
eign investors who were already plagued with similar foreign exchange
problems.39 Many investors began to question whether their efforts to
gain a foothold in China were worthwhile.'
As early as 1983, the Chinese government recognized the foreign
exchange problem. The Implementing Act permits the sale of foreign
currency by the Chinese government to joint ventures in specified cir-
cumstances in order to solve a joint venture's foreign currency
shortfall.41 However, the AMC-Beijing incident suggests that this solu-
tion is not adequate. In 1986, the State Council responded to investors'
complaints by enacting the Regulations on Joint Ventures' Balancing of
Foreign Exchange Revenue and Expenditure ("Foreign Exchange Regu-
lations").4 2 The regulations generally formalized methods which joint
ventures were already using to rectify imbalances in their foreign ex-
change accounts.43 The Implementing Act and the Foreign Exchange
Regulations recommended the following methods for generating foreign
exchange to remedy a joint venture's shortfall in hard currency: (a) con-
version of renminbi into foreign currency; (b) export sales of Chinese
products to earn foreign currency; (c) sale in China for foreign currency;
(d) import substitution; (e) swap arrangements; and (f) reinvestment of
renminbi profits.'
The regulations which theoretically provide solutions to hard cur-
rency shortages appeared to be generally welcomed by foreign investors
because they represented the Chinese government's acknowledgement of
the investors' problems and signified a willingness by the government to
address the problems. In retrospect, however, it appears that the Chinese
38 Id at Dl.
39 Id
40 Id. at D4.
41 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 75 ("When a joint venture whose products are mainly
sold on domestic market [sic.] under its approved feasibility study report and contract has an unbal-
ance of foreign exchange income and expenses, the unbalance shall be solved by the people's govern-
ment .... ").
42 The Regulations on Joint Ventures' Balancing of Foreign Exchange Revenue and Expendi-
ture were promulgated by the State Council on Jan. 15, 1986 [hereinafter Foreign Exchange
Regulations].
43 The regulations do not apply to banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions.
See Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 11. (The authorities are not responsible for resolving the
foreign exchange imbalance if a joint venture does not fulfil stipulated contractual obligations for
exports and generation of foreign exchange); Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42, art. 7.
44 See Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42; Implementing Act, supra note 21.
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government took a minimalist approach to investors' hard currency
problems and merely did what it perceived was necessary to appease the
disenchanted foreign investors. The Foreign Exchange Regulations were
only intended to have a restricted application. This intention is evi-
denced by a leading Chinese official's statement that it is not possible "for
a developing country like China to use its scarce foreign exchange
reserves to subsidize joint ventures running a deficit in foreign exchange
earnings.",
4 5
The effectiveness of each method in generating foreign exchange will
be analyzed below in the context of the applicable regulations.46
1. Conversion of Renminbi
Joint ventures that have approval to sell their products in the do-
mestic market may use their renminbi earnings to buy foreign currency
from Chinese government authorities.47 The purchase is restricted for
use to balance the venture's foreign exchange account.48
The renminbi conversion solution, which appears simple in princi-
ple, has proved to be complicated in operation. A Chinese legal expert
explained the process as follows:
To convert the renminbi into foreign currency, a joint venture
should submit its annual renminbi-foreign currency conversion plan to
the department in charge of it and then obtain the foreign currency
from the locally retained foreign exchange reserves of that department.
If the amount converted from the local foreign exchange reserves is
still insufficient, the department in charge shall then present a conver-
sion plan to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations & Trade, and
after the plan is examined and approved by the Ministry together with
the State Planning Commission, the remaining amount to be converted
into foreign currency should be included in the state foreign exchange
plan and solved from the state foreign exchange reserves.4 9
In order to effectuate the joint venture's conversion of renminbi into
foreign exchange, a joint venture must be prepared to submit its currency
conversion plan to two levels of authority, the local department and the
45 Ta-Kuang Chung, Foreign Exchange Balancing Provisions for Joint Ventures, E. ASIAN
EXEC. REP., Feb. 15, 1986, at 7.
46 Besides the six methods listed above, joint ventures have used or propose to use three other
methods to obtain hard currency. The three methods are: (i) using the joint venture as a local
marketing arm; (ii) obtaining hard currency loans; and (iii) maintaining evidence accounts as a
means of determining the amount of foreign exchange a joint venture can purchase from the govern-
ment authorities. These three methods will be discussed later.
47 See Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 75.
48 Id.
49 EXTERNAL DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DAILY, BEIJING, GUIDE TO EQUITY JOINT VEN-
TURES 92 (1985).
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State Planning Commission." °
This system creates at least three problems. First, the joint venture
must submit its foreign exchange requirements yearly and in advance for
inclusion in the annual currency conversion plan."1 This presumes that
the venture can project its foreign exchange needs. The system does not
provide for unforeseen requiements for foreign exchange during the sub-
sequent year.
Second, there is no guarantee that the authorities will provide any or
all of the foreign exchange requested in the joint venture's annual cur-
rency conversion plan. The local government authorities are often reluc-
tant to invade their own foreign exchange reserves to support a foreign
investment project. They are also likely to provide foreign exchange only
to high priority projects.5 2 For example, the joint venture Foxboro-
Shanghai had to convince local authorities that the venture had ex-
hausted all foreign exchange generating alternatives before it was allowed
to convert its renminbi profits into foreign currency. 3 Even then, the
venture had to show that the foreign exchange was needed to keep the
operation going.5 4
This problem may be solved if the joint venture can bind the local
authorities contractually to provide a minimum amount of foreign cur-
rency. It is not easy to extract such a commitment from the local author-
ities because foreign exchange is a precious and limited resource.5"
However, it has been done. For example, the joint venture contract for
Volkswagen-Shanghai requires the State Planning Commission to pro-
vide a specified amount of foreign exchange at the official exchange
rate.56 The amount of foreign exchange was fixed at the value of parts
imported by the venture for the manufacture of cars. 7 Presumably, the
quota of foreign exchange available to Volkswagen-Shanghai was ad-
justed periodically to correspond with the value of imported parts.
The third problem with renminbi conversion is that there is no legis-
lative provision for determining the exchange rate. In practice this has
not proved to be a problem, as the currency conversions have been made
at the official exchange rate. 8
Finally, the renminbi conversion solution is only designed to assist
50 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 75.
51 Id
52 Operating China JVr How Shanghai-Foxboro Copes with Forex Woes, 14 Bus. CHINA 89, 90
(1988). [hereinafter Operating China J~s].
53 Id. at 90.
54 Id
55 Id.
56 Joint Venture Report - Shanghai Volkswagen, CHINA L. PRAC., Feb. 20, 1989, at 37, 41.
57 Id. at 41.
58 Id
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fledgling joint ventures during their initial years of operation. 9 There-
fore, authorizations for currency conversions must be obtained periodi-
cally.' In Volkswagen-Shanghai, the State Planning Commission
guarantee of foreign exchange to the joint venture was limited to the
early phase of the venture.61 Foreign investors must also be wary of
committing the venture to export quotas since government authorities
are not responsible for providing foreign currency to a venture that fails
to meet its export quota.62
Despite the limitations of renminbi conversion, Foxboro-Shanghai,
which was established in 1982, relied on this solution to fill 20% of its
dollar requirements until 1988.63 At that point the government informed
the venture that it could no longer use renminbi conversion as a solution
to its foreign exchange shortages. 64 Foxboro-Shanghai was probably so
successful in converting renminbi because it was willing to put up with
the inconvenience of the system.65
2. Export Sales of Chinese Products
The Foreign Exchange Regulations permit joint ventures to
purchase products made by Chinese enterprises and sell the products
overseas for hard currency.66 Such purchases and sales must be ap-
proved by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
("MOFERT").67
The regulations for such domestic purchases and export-sales are
embodied in the Provisions on the Purchase and Export of Domestic
Products by Foreign-Investment Enterprises to Balance Foreign Ex-
change Accounts ("MOFERT Regulations"). 68  Under the MOFERT
regulations, an application must be made to the local provincial authori-
ties. 69  The application must specify the amount of foreign exchange
needed and the corresponding sum of renminbi needed to buy the domes-
59 Operating China JVs, supra note 52, at 90.
60 Id.
61 Joint Venture Report Shanghai Volkswagen, supra note 56.
62 Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42, art. 7.
63 Operating China JVs, supra note 52, at 90.
64 Id.
65 Id. The joint venture applied periodically to the local authorities for the right to convert its
local earnings into dollars, and justified its need to resort to the conversion process to keep its opera-
tion going. Id.
66 Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42, art. 6.
67 Provisions on the Purchase and Export of Domestic Products by Foreign-Investment Enter-
prises to Balance Foreign Exchange Accounts (Promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade on Jan. 1, 1987) (LEXIS, Asiap library, Chinal file) [hereinafter MOFERT
Regulations].
68 Id.
69 Id. art. 3.
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tic product for export.70 The names, specifications, quantities, and ex-
port channels of the domestic product must also be specified in the
application.71 Joint ventures are further encouraged to purchase from
Chinese enterprises within their locality.7 2 If the domestic product has
to be purchased from a different locality, the approval of the local pro-
vincial authority in that locality must be obtained.73
There are two legal limitations to the domestic purchase and export-
sale solution. First, this method can be used only to solve "temporary
difficulties" experienced by joint ventures.74 Second, the quantity of do-
mestic products that can be exported is limited to the amounts necessary
to obtain the foreign exchange required to cover the shortfall in produc-
tion, the repatriation of the foreign investor's profits, and the remittance
of capital upon the liquidation of the joint venture.7" It is apparent that
these two express limitations are required by China in order to protect
the monopolies of its domestic trading companies by preventing competi-
tion from foreign trading operations.
In practice, there is a third limitation. Chinese producers of interna-
tionally marketable goods are often unwilling to sell their products to
joint ventures for renminbi when they can sell the products overseas for
hard currency.76 As a result, the range of Chinese goods available for
export by joint ventures is often restricted to the least desirable ones
which do not have an export market.
Some joint ventures have not been deterred by the limitations of the
domestic purchase and export-sale method. This is especially true if the
joint venture is able to sell to other subdivisions of the foreign partner
and to show that it is creating new markets for China, rather than in-
fringing on the "rice bowl" of the state trading companies. For example,
the Hewlett-Packard joint venture in Beijing plans to generate foreign
exchange by selling locally-sourced components and subassemblies that
can be used by Hewlett-Packard in its operations around the world.7 7
UOP-Shanghai, a joint venture manufacturing molecular sieves, also in-
tends to take advantage of this method by exporting raw materials
sourced in China to UOP's plants in the U.S., Italy, and Japan.78
A slight variation to the domestic purchase and export-sale method
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
73 MOFERT Regulations, supra note 67, art. 5.
74 Id. art. 2.
75 Id art. 4.
76 See Florasynth's Shanghai JV-Sweet Smells, Flavors for Export & Local Sales, 13 Bus.
CHINA 40 (1987).
77 China HP, Part 1. Coping with Forex, Local Sourcing, 13 Bus. CHINA 17, 17 (1987).
78 UOP's Staffing Strategy for its Sieve-Making JVin Shanghai, 15 Bus. CHINA 66, 67 (1989).
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has been successfully used by joint ventures. Instead of buying products
made by Chinese enterprises and exporting them, a venture can manufac-
ture additional products that can be used by the foreign parent company
and its affiliates overseas. These additional products are then exported to
earn foreign exchange. For example, Foxboro-Shanghai, which was es-
tablished to manufacture electronic process controls, also manufactures
electronic subassemblies for export to Foxboro affiliates around the
world in order to earn hard currency. This method of generating hard
currency is only available to joint ventures that have the capacity to man-
ufacture products that can be used by their operations outside of China.
It is unlikely that a venture will purposely embark on the production of
new products just to sell them to its overseas affiliates for hard currency.
A more likely scenario is that a joint venture that is already producing
certain components for the venture's Chinese operations will increase its
components production for sale to the venture's overseas operations to
generate hard currency earnings.
3. Sale in China for Foreign Exchange
As a general rule, products sold by joint ventures on the Chinese
domestic market must be paid for in renminbi.79 To assist joint ventures
in increasing their foreign exchange income, the Foreign Exchange Regu-
lations created three exceptions to this general rule.80
First, foreign exchange may be used in the domestic market for sales
of "sophisticated products."8 " Foreign exchange may also be paid in
sales of products of "high quality" that are competitive on the interna-
tional market.82 Additionally such products must be "urgently needed"
by China and be "certified as up to standard" by local authorities.8 3 It is
extremely onerous for a joint venture to utilize this exception to earn
foreign exchange because of the host of conditions to be satisfied.84 Fur-
ther, since the provision is couched in ambiguous terms, a joint venture
cannot determine in advance of its application if its product is of suffi-
ciently "high quality" or is "badly needed" by the state. To avoid ambi-
guities a foreign investor should attempt to include in the joint venture
contract permission for domestic sales in hard currency. 85
79 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 66.
80 See Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42, arts. 4, 5, 8.
81 Sophisticated products are those manufactured using advanced technology or lay techo-
nology provided by a foreign investor.
82 Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42, art. 4.
83 Id.
84 See id.
85 Hewlett-Packard was careful to include in its contract such a provision, allowing the Beijing
joint venture to sell locally for foreign exchange. China HP, Part 1: Coping with Forex Local Sourc-
ing, supra note 77, at 18.
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Second, a joint venture may obtain foreign exchange from domestic
sales if its product is certified as an import substitute.8 6 Again certain
conditions must be fulfilled and approval must be obtained before a joint
venture may qualify its product as an import substitute."1
Third, domestic sales may be made for foreign exchange if the cus-
tomer is located outside the special economic zones and the economic
and technological development zones of the open coastal cities.88 The
approval of the foreign exchange control department must be obtained
for such domestic sales."9 This exception appears easy to satisfy because
a joint venture need only fulfill two conditions; the domestic sale must
take place outside the specified zones and the authorities must approve
the sale.90
After a joint venture qualifies under one of the exceptions to sell
domestically for foreign exchange, the joint venture must next convince
domestic purchasers to surrender their foreign currency. However, for-
eign currency is a scarce commodity in China and domestic purchasers
are unwilling to easily part with it.91 As a result, inducements have to be
offered to such purchasers. For example, the experience of Coca Cola-
Hainan shows that domestic purchasers may be willing to pay in foreign
exchange if they are given price incentives. 92
The best domestic customers are usually other foreign-related indus-
tries, since they are more likely to have a surplus foreign exchange in-
come. For example, Coca Cola-Hainan sells its products domestically to
hotels for foreign exchange. 93
Despite the practical problems of selling domestically for hard cur-
rency, at least one joint venture, Foxboro-Shanghai, has had great suc-
cess. For Foxboro-Shanghai, domestic sales of its electronic process
86 Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42, art. 5.
87 See The Measures Relating to the Import Substitution by Products Manufactured by Sino-
Foreign Equity and Contractual Joint Ventures, art. 3 (promulgated by the State Planning Commis-
sion on Oct. 1, 1987) (LEXIS Asiapc library, Chinal fie) [hereinafter Import Substitution Regula-
tions]; see also China-Joint Ventures, 1987 NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK MARKET REPORTS,
March 1987, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Busanl File.
88 Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42 art. 8.
89 Id.
90 See id.
91 See U.S. Cites China, Others for Barriers to Free Trade, REUTERs, Mar. 29, 1991 (LEXIS,
NEXIS library, Reuters File); China Will Tighten Price Controls on Foreign Trade, REUTER, Mar.
22, 1991 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Reuters file).
92 Coca-Cola's New Hainan Joint Venture, CHINA L. PRAc., Aug. 20, 1990, at 22, 26. See also
Jerome A. Cohen & Stuart J. Valentine, Recent Chinese Legislation Assisting Foreign Investors to
Solve their Hard Currency Problem: Import Substitution and Other Options, B.Y.U. L. REv., 1988,
at 519, 530. Incentive is created by offering customers a choice of paying either an adjusted
renminbi price or foreign exchange price. The renminbi price is adjusted to account for the cost of
obtaining the foreign exchange required in the course of operating the joint venture.
93 Coca-Cola's New Hainan Joint Venture, supra note 92.
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control instruments have been its most important source of foreign
exchange.94
4. Import Substitution
Import substitution, which refers to the manufacture and sale in
China of products that China must otherwise import, has been en-
couraged since 1983. For example, the Implementing Act allows joint
ventures in China to sell their products domestically for foreign currency
if the products are those which "Chinese trading companies need to
import." 95
Through the enactment of the Implementing Act, China recognizes
that import substitution is an ideal way to solve the foreign exchange
problems of both foreign investors and China. These problems are solved
because import substitution allows a joint venture to increase its foreign
exchange income and at the same time it decreases China's foreign ex-
change expenditure. Therefore, more foreign exchange remains in the
country if a product is produced locally than if the same product is im-
ported since only the foreign exchange attributable to the profit of the
foreign investor is remitted abroad. On the other hand, if the product is
imported, the full price in foreign currency flows out of China. 96
It has not always been clear which products created by joint ven-
tures are import substitutes. Since the Implementing Act merely sets out
general principles, regulations were enacted in 1986 and 1987 to clarify
and set out the procedure to certify joint venture products as import sub-
stitutes.97 In 1986, the Foreign Exchange Regulations also permitted
joint venture products to be certified as import substitutes if the products
were those that China needed to import on a long-term or urgent basis.98
In the following year, the Measures Relating to the Import Substitution
by Sino-Foreign Equity and Contractual Joint Ventures ("Import Substi-
tution Regulations") were enacted.99 The Import Substitution Regula-
tions were made expressly applicable to joint ventures that provide
"advanced technology" needed by China and are involved in the "devel-
opment and generation transition of existing products.""l°° Presumably,
94 Operating China JVs, supra note 52, at 90.
95 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 64.
96 Another benefit of local production of import substitutes is that it creates jobs for the Chi-
nese and stimulates the local economy by requiring that manufacturing facilities be set up. See
generally China-Country Marketing Plan FY '93, 1992 NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK MARKET
REPORTS, Sept. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc library, Busanl file.
97 See generally Provincial Provisions for Encouraging Foreign Investment in Heilongiiano
Province (promulgated by Heilongliang Province on Dec. 18, 1986) (LEXIS, Asiapc library, Chinal
file.
98 Id
99 Import Substitution Regulations, supra note 87.
1oo Id. art. 2.
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joint ventures that do not fall within the advanced technology category
are still governed by the 1986 regulations as there is no preemptive clause
in the Import Substitution Regulations.10'
Currently, a joint venture product must also satisfy stringent condi-
tions to qualify as an import substitute under the Import Substitution
Regulations: (1) the joint venture itself must be equipped with advanced
technology needed by China; (2) the product must be one that the central
and local authorities or departments are currently importing and will
continue to import; and (3) the product must be tested by the state-level
product quality inspection center and must be up to the standard of simi-
lar imported goods.102
The experience of a foreign investor further suggests that elaborate
distinctions 10 3 are made between products that may be approved as im-
port substitutes before production, during the joint venture negotiation,
and products that must first be produced before substitution status may
be granted." 4 If the product is listed in the state import plan, applica-
tion for import substitution approval may be made at the feasibility study
stage of the joint venture negotiations. t0 However, "in principle, no ad-
vance approval will be given for products" that are not included in the
state import plan." 6 According to Chinese sources, to obtain approval
for non-planned imports, the joint venture must first find a Chinese cus-
tomer for the products and persuade that customer to purchase the joint
venture products rather than imports. 10 7 To persuade that customer, the
joint venture must first produce the product intended for import substitu-
tion.' 8 If the joint venture product is not within the state import plan,
import substitution is a difficult mechanism to implement. In this case,
foreign investors should not rely on import substitution as a long-term
means of generating foreign exchange. 10 9
If the joint venture product is within the state import plan, import
substitution can be an attractive option, as it alleviates both the joint
venture's and China's foreign exchange problems. It is made more at-
101 Unlike article 12 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations which provides that the regulations
will prevail over other prior promulgations in the event of discrepancies. See Foreign Exchange
Regulations, supra note 42, art. 12.
102 Import Substitution Regulations, supra note 87, art. 3.
103 Apparently, the distinction is based on articles 6 and 7 of the of the Import Substitution
Regulations. See Id. arts. 6, 7.
104 Import Substitution, CHINA L. PRAC., July 1988, at 31.
105 Measures Relating to the Import Substitution by Products Manufactured by Chinese-For-
eign Equity Joint Ventures and Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Ventures (promulgated by the People's
National Congress on October 1, 1987) (LEXIS, Aisapc Library, Chinal file).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Import Substitution, supra note 104, at 32.
109 Id.
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tractive to joint ventures because domestic purchasers are required to use
import substitution products in priority to other products, thereby grant-
ing foreign investors a monopoly on import substitution products,110 and
because joint ventures are guaranteed the support of government depart-
ments in concluding purchase and sales contracts with domestic end-
users.III Unlike joint ventures that sell domestically for hard currency,joint ventures that sell import substitutes do not need to convince domes-
tic purchasers to part with their foreign exchange. The challenge forjoint ventures is to change the embedded Chinese attitude that all goods
made in China, including those made by Sino-foreign joint ventures, are
inferior to goods made abroad.
Evidence of the success of import substitution may be found in the
Foxboro-Shanghai and Schindler Elevator joint ventures. These joint
ventures already have products listed in the Mechanical and Electrical
Import Substitutes Catalog.112
5. Swap Arrangements
In February 1986, Chinese legislation granted foreign investors who
have more than one investment in China permission to offset the deficit
of one of their ventures against the surplus of another venture' 1 3 Such
adjustment must be approved by the foreign exchange control
department.' 14
The practical limitations of such an arrangement are apparent. The
foreign investor must have more than one joint venture in China, and at
least one of the joint ventures must be generating a surplus in its foreign
exchange account. There are foreign investors with more than one ven-
ture in China. One example is Printronics, an Australian corporation,
which has three joint ventures located in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and
Tianjin." 5 Another example is Carrier, a U.S. corporation, which has
two joint ventures, both located in Shanghai.116 However, foreigners
with more than one joint venture are few and far between. Therefore,
few joint ventures are able use this method to balance their foreign ex-
change account.
The State Council probably realized the limitations of their Febru-
ary legislation. Eight months later, in October 1986, the State Council
110 Import Substitution Regulations, supra note 87, art. 8.
111 Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42, art. 5.
112 CAMPBELL, supra note 23, at 68.
113 Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 42, art. 9.
114 Id.
115 Australia Firm Uses PRC Venture as Lessons for Other Asian Projects, 14 Bus. CHINA 9, 10
(1989).
116 Carrier Picks Shanghai as Site for Two JVs Making Air Conditioners, 13 Bus. CHINA 49
(1987).
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promulgated the Provisions of -the State Council on the Encouragement
of Foreign Investment ("Twenty-two Articles").117 Unrelated joint ven-
tures are now allowed to mutually adjust their foreign exchange sur-
pluses and deficiencies under the supervision of the foreign exchange
control department.118 To facilitate the adjustments, currency swap cen-
ters have been established.1 19 Initially, the centers were segregated be-
tween those for Chinese enterprises and those for foreign investment
enterprises.120 Presently, however many cities allow foreign investment
enterprises and domestic Chinese enterprises to participate in the same
market.121
On the other hand, there are two major shortcomings to the swap
arrangement. The swap center can provide a joint venture with foreign
exchange only to the extent that other joint ventures have a surplus in
foreign exchange and are willing to convert the excess to renminbi.
However, this drawback is probably offset by the relatively simple proce-
dure it entails. The buyers and sellers of foreign exchange need only
obtain the approval of the foreign exchange administration department
before the swap. Once the approval is obtained, the parties are free to
negotiate their own exchange rates; that is, these swap arrangements are
governed by the open market forces of supply and demand. This leads to
the next drawback of the arrangement. The purchaser of foreign ex-
change must pay a substantial premium over the official conversion rate
to induce the sale of foreign exchange for renminbi. For example,
Foxboro-Shanghai, which has often resorted to foreign exchange centers
to swap renminbi for dollars, paid a premium of 25-30% in 1986, and a
premium of 50% in 1988 because of higher demand by joint ventures and
local firms.12 2
The swap arrangement has proved to be a very popular solution
among joint ventures. Beijing and Shanghai approved $71 million in
swaps between November 1986 and early 1988, and 130 of Shanghai's
220 foreign investment enterprises in operation have used the Shanghai
currency swap center.123 OMI-Shenzhen, a joint venture established in
1984 to produce electroplating chemicals, has reported that it obtains
117 The Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on the Encourage-
ment of Foreign Investment (promulgated by the State Council on Oct. 11, 1986) (LEXIS, Asiape
library, Chinal file) [hereinafter Twenty-two Articles].
118 Id. art. 14.
119 See Zhao Zijian, U.S. - China Trade to Set Record This Year, XINHUA GENERAL OVER-
SEAS NEWS SERVICE, July 8, 1988, available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, Xinhua file.
120 Cohen & Valentine, Recent Chinese Legislation Assisting Foreign Investors to Solve their
Hard Currency Problem: Import Substitution and Other Options, B.Y.U. L. REv., 1988, at 519, 523.
121 Id.
122 Operating China JVs, supra note 52, at 90.
123 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 120, at 524.
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most of its foreign exchange through the local swap center. 24
6. Reinvestment of Remninbi Profits
The reinvestment of profits from a joint venture has been sanctioned
since 1979,125 but the Foreign Exchange Regulations have highlighted
such reinvestment in China as a means to generate foreign exchange.
Renminbi profits may be reinvested in "enterprises in China... which
are able to generate foreign exchange or to increase foreign exchange in-
come."1 26 The approval of MOFERT and the foreign exchange control
authorities must be obtained for such reinvestment. 27 The foreign ex-
change generated from this reinvestment can also be used to repatriate
the foreign investor's profits from the original joint venture.
There appears to be no restriction on the type of enterprise in which
the reinvestment may be made. Theoretically, it may even be possible for
foreign investors to invest in Chinese enterprises. However, this is un-
likely to happen since most Chinese enterprises are state-owned.1 21 In
the immediate future, it is likely that reinvestments will be made in other
Sino-foreign joint ventures.
It is hard to imagine a foreign investor resorting quickly to reinvest-
ment in another venture as a means of generating foreign exchange. In-
vestors would only consider this option if they already have problems
with their original joint venture. They would, therefore, be wary of in-
vesting in a second joint venture in an attempt to solve the problems of
the first venture.
Even if investment in Chinese enterprises becomes feasible in the
future, it is unlikely to become a solution to the foreign investor's hard
currency problems. First, a Chinese enterprise would not be enthusiastic
about a foreign investor investing in renminbi. The enterprise would be
better off accepting a local investor with whom they are familiar. Sec-
ond, it is unlikely that the Chinese enterprise would pay hard currency
dividends to the investor even if the enterprise earns hard currency prof-
its. There is no legislation requiring payment of dividends in hard cur-
rency, and it is not likely that the Chinese enterprise would volunteer to
do so.
7. Other Methods of Generating Foreign Exchange
a. Using the Joint Venture as a Marketing Arm
To increase their foreign exchange earnings, some joint ventures
124 Electroplating Loses Its Lustre at OMI's China Venture, 15 Bus. CHINA 186, 187 (1989).
125 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
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have taken on the added role of marketing agent for the foreign investor's
parent company. The joint venture then earns foreign exchange in the
form of commissions paid by the foreign parent company. For example,
Hewlett-Packard contractually provided that commissions earned by its
joint venture from selling the parent company's products in China would
be credited to the joint venture's foreign exchange account. 12 9 The bulk
of the venture's hard currency needs were met by these commission pay-
ments in 1987.13° Stoody has also used its Shanghai joint venture as the
local marketing arm to sell Stoody products, such as machinery used in
welding and hardfacing operations.' The joint venture earns hard cur-
rency commissions for the sales.132
b. Loans
There is always the option of taking a hard currency loan from the
Bank of China.133 Pursuant to the Bank of China Regulations on Pro-
viding Loans to Enterprises with Foreign Investment,'34 three'types of
foreign exchange loans are available to joint ventures: (1) fixed assets
loans to finance construction and installation costs, and to purchase tech-
nology and equipment; (2) working capital loans, to provide funds
needed by a joint venture for normal operation, manufacturing, and mar-
keting of products; and (3) stand-by credit. 135
Because of the disadvantages of these loans, it is likely that ventures
will only resort to hard currency loans in emergencies. The disadvantages
are that the venture has to provide security for the loan;136 the venture
has to pay interest on the loan, presumably in hard currency; 37 and the
loan has to be repaid in hard currency. 13 The last two factors may be
the greatest deterrence to obtaining a hard currency loan.
c. Evidence Accounts
Foreign investors have proposed the use of evidence accounts as a
means of determining the amount of foreign exchange they are entitled to
129 China HP, Part 1: Coping with Forex, Local Sourcing, supra note 77, at 18.
130 Id at 17.
131 The Stoody JV, Part 1: Adapting to Change in the Foreign Parent, 13 Bus. CHINA 177, 178,
(1987).
132 Id.
133 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 78.
134 The Regulations of Bank of China on Providing Loans to Enterprises with Foreign Invest-
ment (Promulgated by the Bank of China on April 24, 1987) (LEXIS, Asiapc library, Chinal file)
[hereinafter Bank Regulations].
135 Id. art. 5.
136 Id arts. 7, 16.
137 Id arts. 7, 18.
138 Id. art. 18.
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purchase from the local authorities. 139 The general proposal is that an
evidence account should keep track of the amount of foreign exchange
the foreign investor spends in China. At a later date, if the venture needs
to convert renminbi into foreign currency, the evidence account will be
used to calculate the amount of foreign currency the venture is entitled to
buy from the government at the official exchange rate. For example, if
the foreign investor spent $20,000 in China, that venture should be enti-
tled to buy $20,000 or a percentage thereof, from the government at the
official exchange rate. The rationale of the evidence account is that the
joint venture should at least be entitled to buy back a percentage of the
foreign currency that the foreign investor brought into the Chinese econ-
omy. Apparently, Shanghai has already subscribed to this method of ac-
counting on an ad hoc basis."4
The potential advantages of the evidence account are threefold.
First, foreign investors will be encouraged to source locally. The higher
the level of local sourcing, the higher the amount of renminbi that can be
converted into hard currency at the official exchange rate. This method
has an advantage over the swap arrangement because the lower official
exchange rate applies to the conversion. Second, in addition to inducing
an increase in existing purchases from Chinese enterprises, the method
will encourage foreign investors to switch from purchases currently made
overseas to local sourcing.1 41 Third, this method offers some certainty in
the amount of foreign exchange that will be available to the foreign inves-
tor. The amount can be calculated in proportion to previous hard cur-
rency expenditures in China.
It remains to be seen if the Chinese authorities will sanction the use
of evidence accounts. As pointed out above, the evidence account offers
advantages to foreign investors and China. At the same time, the Chi-
nese authorities must be prepared to lose control over foreign exchange
availability, since joint ventures may convert renminbi into hard cur-
rency in proportion to the foreign investor's hard currency expenditure
in China.
B. Local Sourcing
Local sourcing of raw materials and components has been cited as
the second most pressing problem for joint ventures operating in China,
next to balancing foreign exchange income and expenditure. 42 There is
no statutory requirement that joint ventures purchase domestic raw
materials or components. Instead, the Joint Venture Law and the Imple-
139 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 120, at 530-31.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 The two problems are often interconnected.
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menting Act merely require joint ventures to give "first priority to
purchases in China" when "conditions are the same" between local
purchasing and imports.143 Local sourcing is encouraged for the devel-
opment of domestic industries in China.
The Implementing Act provides four official channels 1" through
which joint ventures may purchase materials in China:
(1) under planned distribution of the state (the joint venture's pro-
posed purchase must be included in the supply plan of the de-
partment in charge of the joint venture),
(2) from the state materials and commercial departments,
(3) from production enterprises or through commission agencies,
(4) from foreign trade corporations that handle export items. 145
In the experience of Thurmond-Shanghai, it is more efficient, if pos-
sible, to bypass all four official channels and purchase directly from any-
one who is willing to sell the material. In 1987, the joint venture found
itself with extra capacity, having met its quota for the year." 6 It needed
extra material to produce beyond the quota and pay the workers a bo-
nus.147 The venture's Chinese personnel located a willing supplier in
Wuhan.1 48 Renminbi and material changed hands and the deal was
completed.149 The foreign investor's side had this to say about the trans-
action, "[t]hey don't ask us why we want the material, we don't ask them
why they're selling it. We don't ask anyone for permission, and no one
tells us no. What a system!"150
Although local sourcing is not required, most joint ventures strive to
increase the local content of their production in order to decrease their
foreign exchange expenditure. The frustrations encountered by joint
ventures in local sourcing are summarized up by Mr. Lowry, Director of
American Motors Corporation, as follows:
The Chinese tell us they can provide virtually everything but it doesn't
work that way. When you find the supplier, it almost always turns out
that he can't guarantee the quantity or quality, or the prices are out of
line, or they want to sell you 10,000 items when all you need is a few
hundred. 151
Overall, the three problems most commonly encountered in local
143 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 9; Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 57.
144 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 58.
145 Id.
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sourcing are: (1) non-availability or shortage of material, (2) poor quality
of materials, and (3) high prices of materials.
1. Non-availability or Shortage of Materials
The materials needed by joint ventures are sometimes simply not
available in China. OMI's electroplating joint venture in Shenzhen has
to import 50% of its product's value because the chemicals required for
production are not found in China. 52
The problem is further exacerbated by the longstanding central
planning system, which provides incentives for local managers to meet
centrally mandated quotas.s 3 Meeting the quotas has become the defini-
tion of success, and managers have developed systems which are verti-
cally integrated to ensure the supply of materials necessary for
production to meet the quotas.1 54 Consequently, there are very few in-
dependent suppliers able or willing to supply materials.
If a joint venture is fortunate enough to find the right material, it
may encounter problems of inadequacy or unreliability of supply. For
example, despite a contractual supply agreement, Hitachi-Fujian, which
manufactures color televisions, was forced to halt operations for several
months in 1986 because its supply of components was disrupted. 55
Some ventures, such as Warner Lambert, which manufactures gelatin
capsules in Jiangsu, offer inducements to their suppliers in order to en-
sure a steady source of materials. 15 6  Warner Lambert offered its
Guangdong supplier the possibility of exporting raw gelatin in Asia. 57 If
the factory supplied the gelatin on time and at a reasonable renminbi
price, the supplier could sell to Warner Lambert's overseas operations for
foreign exchange. 158
Other joint ventures have resorted to manufacturing the compo-
nents required by the joint venture. This option is not always viable be-
cause the required quality may make the cost prohibitive. Also, the joint
venture may not have the expertise to manufacture the components.
Parker-Hubei has attempted unsuccessfully to persuade its overseas poly-
152 Electroplating Loses its Lustre at OMI's China Venture, supra note 124, at 187.
153 Economies in Transition: Guidelines for Doing Business in China and the US.S.R. EAST
ASIAN EXEc. REPS., July 15, 1988, at 9 (in China, "[a] longstanding central planning system has for
the last 40 years provided incentive for local managers to meet centrally mandated quotas").
154 Id.
155 L. Crawford Brickley, Equity Joint Ventures in the PRC: The Promised Land is Not Yet in
Sight for Foreign Investors, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 257, 282 n.140 (1988).




EQUITY JOINT VENTURES IN THE P.ARC
mer supplier to set up a plant in China.159
2. Poor Quality of Materials
Even if a joint venture is fortunate enough to find local materials in
sufficient quantities, the materials are often of poor quality.1" A com-
mon complaint is that locally sourced materials are below international
standards. 61 This quality problem is not limited to raw materials. For
example, in the Beijing-Tokyo joint venture, an existing building was
renovated to accommodate joint venture operations. 162 Upon comple-
tion, it was found that much of the construction work was poor.163 The
concrete used was of a lower grade than designated, and the walls began
to crumble soon after the renovation was complete.' The fuses often
blew and the boiler did not operate properly as a result of poor circula-
tion planning. 16
5
Sometimes, the quality problem is compounded by the Chinese bu-
reaucracy. For example, in the Gillette-Shenyang joint venture, the top
quality nuts and valves required were available, but since the project was
classified under light industry, it was only entitled to low-quality bolts
and valves. 16 6 The matter was resolved only after a visit to the governor
of Shenyang.167
Even where the quality of the material is of an acceptable standard,
there is the further problem of inconsistency of the standard of quality
over time. For example, Parker-Hubei continues to rely on imported
polymers to manufacture 0-ring seals because local materials have
proved to be inconsistent from batch to batch.168 Stoody-Shanghai has
also reported "unsteady" quality in local materials. 169 To minimize the
impact of the inconsistent inputs, Stoody has modified its manufacturing
process. 
170
The problem of poor quality goods may be traced to the centrally-
planned economy, which does not reward the production of quality prod-
159 Parker-Hubei JV Part 2: US Partner's View of Wuhan Joint Venture's Woes, 14 Bus.
CHINA 73, 74 (1988).
160 Beling Tokyo Photographic Art Co., Ltd., CHINA NEWSL. (Japan External Trade Org.,
Tokyo, Japan) Apr. 1989, at 9, 11.
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ucts. Instead, a central command system only focuses on producing the
quota allocated, regardless of the quality of the products.17
The quality problem is prevalent throughout all industries in China
and the government has recently begun to deal with it.'7 2 The Ministry
of Light Industry and other government departments are jointly issuing
production licenses to qualified enterprises in order to force enterprises
producing low quality goods out of operation.1
73
Joint ventures have adopted various techniques in dealing with qual-
ity setbacks. For example, Skipper-Nanjing, a joint venture which manu-
factures sounding equipment and other marine navigation aids, offers
technical assistance to its local suppliers to achieve quality standards and
to have better control over local supply standards. 74 The foreign inves-
tor also sends, once a year, three Norwegian officers on short-term as-
signments to visit its local suppliers in Nanjing.175
Foxboro-Shanghai has taken a different approach to accelerate the
integration of local materials. The joint venture has built a quality-test-
ing laboratory in its Shanghai factory to enabling it to test locally. 176
Local testing avoids the delays associated with shipping the product
overseas for testing. 177 At the same time, it allows the Chinese supplier
to participate in the evaluation and to learn the weakness of its prod-
ucts.17 8 In this manner, the joint venture can work with the supplier to
correct the weakness of the product.
Finally, joint ventures such as Hewlett-Packard have simply relo-
cated to a feasible site of supply. The joint venture was forced to move
its manufacturing facilities from Peking to Shenzhen because it was very
difficult to source locally in Peking. 17
3. High Prices of Materials
After getting past the hurdles of availability and quality, joint ven-
171 See Economies in Transition: Guidelines for Doing Business in China and the U.S.S.R.,
supra note 153.
172 Several years ago, the new Minister for the Light Industry, Zheng Xianlin, did make an
effort to eradicate the quality problem. He proposed holding an exhibition for shoddy goods. This
idea met with strong resistance from various sources which feared that the exhibition could cause a
number of enterprises to close down. The total output value under the state plan could not be
achieved if enterprises closed down. Time to Get Rid of Shoddy Goods, CHINA ECON. NEWS, Nov.
12, 1990, at 2.
173 Id. at 1.
174 Japanese Methods Help Norwegian JV Increase Local Content and Quality, 15 Bus. CHINA
108, 109 (1989).
175 Id.
176 Operating China JVs, supra note 52, at 90.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Overcoming the Pitfalls of Sourcing in the PRC, Part 2, 15 Bus. CHINA 153 (1989).
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tures often confront erratic pricing in China. Also, raw materials such as
coal are priced at a fraction of world prices, but the cost of manufactured
components can be much higher than comparable world prices. For ex-
ample, Stoody-Shanghai, a joint venture which makes metal welding
rods, electrodes, and wires, sources 70% of its materials locally, but must
still import one key ingredient, cobalt, because the price of cobalt in
China is twice the price on the world market. '8 0Prices for locally sourced
materials are determined as provided in the Implementing Act: 81
(1) The price for raw materials, such as gold, silver, platinum, petro-
leum, coal, and timber which are used directly in export produc-
tion are pegged to "international market prices." 18 2  This
international market price is determined by government authori-
ties and may be paid in foreign currency or renminbi.18 3
(2) The price for materials handled by Chinese foreign trade compa-
nies is negotiated by the parties, again with reference to interna-
tional market prices.'" 4 Foreign currency must be paid in this
case. 185
(3) The price for materials not covered by (1) and (2) is pegged to
prices paid by state-owned enterprises, and payment must be
made in renminbi.18 6
Before 1986, the pricing provisions offered little, if any, protection
against price gouging by local Chinese suppliers. The provisions were
too flexible as prices were determined by the Chinese seller. Joint ven-
tures lacked local yardsticks against which to compare the prices and
lacked legal recourse against the seller ifthe price was too high. Joint
ventures were held to ransom because materials were needed for produc-
tion, and they were usually scarce and hard to obtain.
The State Council recognized the price gouging problem and at-
tempted to protect foreign investments in the Twenty-two Provisions.187
All government authorities are directed to curb indiscriminate pricing,
and authorities at the provincial level are required to formulate specific
methods to calculate prices. 88 The provincial authorities are also re-
quired to strengthen supervision and administration to prevent price
gouging. Further, the provisions give joint ventures redress against re-
calcitrant sellers.'8 9 Joint ventures now have the right of appeal to local
180 The Stoody JV, Part 1: Adapting to Change in the Foreign Parent, supra note 131, at 178.
181 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 65.
182 Id. art. 65(1).
183 Id.
184 Id. art. 65(2)
185 Id.
186 Id. art. 65(3).
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economic committees and to the State Economic Commission if the ven-
ture is a victim of price gouging.
C. Labor Management
Foreign investors have experienced problems in three main areas of
labor management: (a) recruitment; (b) dismissal; and (c) bureaucratic
interference.
In general, the five main legislations that govern labor management
by joint ventures are:
(1) Provisions on the People's Republic of China for Labor Man-
agement in Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, implemented on
July 26, 1980 ("1980 Labor Regulations"). 190
(2) Procedures for the Implementation of the Provisions for Labor
Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign In-
vestment, implemented on December 24, 1983 ("1983 Labor
Regulations").191
(3) Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of
China for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, imple-
mented on October 11, 1986 ("Twenty-Two Articles").192
(4) Provisions of the Ministry of Labor and Personnel of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China on the Right of Autonomy of Enter-
prises with Foreign Investment in the Hiring of Personnel and
on Wages, Insurance and Welfare expenses of Staff and Work-
ers, implemented on November 28, 1986 ("1986 Labor
Regulations").193
(5) Decisions on Personnel Management of Foreign Investment
Enterprises, implemented on December 15, 1988 ("1988 Labor
Decisions"). 194
This series of regulations, which were promulgated from 1980
through 1988, reflect a liberalizing trend of control over labor manage-
190 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labor Management in Chinese-Foreign
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (promulgated by the State Council on July
26, 1980). (LEXIS, Asiapc library, Chinal file) [hereinafter 1980 Labor Regulations].
191 Procedures for the Implementation of the Provisions for Labor Management in Joint Ven-
tures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (promulgated on Dec. 24, 1983) (WESTLAW, Intlaw
library, Chinalaw file) [hereinafter 1983 Labor Regulations].
192 Twenty-two Articles, supra note 118.
193 Regulations for the Autonomous Right of the Enterprises with Foreign Investment to Em-
ploy Personnel, the Wages and Salaries, and the Expenses for Insurance and Welfare Benefits for
Staff Members and Workers (promulgated by the People's National Congress on Nov. 10, 1986)
(LEXIS, Asiapc library, Chinal file) [hereinafter 1986 Labor Regulations].
194 Decisions on Personnel Management of Foreign Investment Enterprises, (promulgated by
the Ministry of Labor and Personnel on Dec. 15, 1988) (LEXIS, Asiapc library, Chinal file) [herein-
after 1988 Labor Decisions].
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ment by the Chinese government. The Chinese government probably re-
alized that cheap labor is one of the primary reasons foreign investors are
willing to locate their operations in China. If the government failed to
address the investors' labor-management concerns, investment in China
would have most likely lost much of its attraction.
1. Recruitment
Lack of autonomy and lack of skilled labor are the two major con-
cerns of foreign investors when recruiting personnel in China. 1 95
a. Workers
Joint ventures did not always enjoy autonomy in recruiting workers,
and this lack of autonomy in turn affected the quality of the workers
hired. Under the 1980 Labor Regulations, joint ventures may either em-
ploy workers recommended by the local labor department, or may re-
cruit workers on their own, subject to the consent of the labor
department.'96 In theory, joint ventures may recruit directly through
newspaper advertisements, or from training courses, universities, and re-
search institutes, so long as the approval of the labor department is
obtained.
In practice, most joint ventures are staffed by personnel brought
over by the Chinese partner from its own unit without regard for skills or
qualifications. Joint ventures are pressured to accept the recommenda-
tion of the Chinese partner without instituting formal selection proce-
dures. There is no legislative requirement that the foreign investor
accept the Chinese partner's "recommendation" on recruitment. But the
foreign partner is usually not inclined to go beyond initial protests
against the "recommendation" for practical reasons. The foreign partner
does not want the joint venture relationship to start at an acrimonious
level, and the foreign partner must still rely on the Chinese partner for
assistance in the future. For example, in Beijing-Tokyo, the joint venture
was pressured into taking over 80 employees from the old photograph
center when the venture only needed 40 workers. 197 Since it is difficult
for the foreign partner to resist the Chinese partner's pressures without
jeopardizing the future operation of the venture, the only solution is for
the Chinese government to pressure the Chinese counterparts to refrain
from such acts. Indeed, the trend of Chinese legislation is toward liberal-
ization of recruitment by the joint ventures.
The main focus of the labor regulations enacted from 1983 through
195 1980 Labor Regulations, supra note 190, art. 3.
196 Id.
197 Being Tokyo Photographic Art Co., Ltd., supra note 160, at 12 (while eighty employees
were originally hired, fifty employees were ultimately fired after negotiations).
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1988 was to liberalize the recruitment of workers from other localities.1 98
The 1983 regulations sanctioned the recruitment of engineers, techni-
cians, and managing personnel from other localities provided such work-
ers could not be found in the venture's own locality. 199 However, such
recruitment is subject to the approval of labor authorities in the venture's
locality and in the locality where each prospective worker is located.')
The 1986 Labor Regulations further enhanced outside hiring of workers
by requiring the original work units to "give their support and permit the
transfer." ' 1 If the original work unit refuses an employee transfer, or
some other dispute arises, the foreign investor may submit the dispute for
adjudication.'02 Finally, the 1988 Labor Decisions went even further,
prohibiting the original work unit from using "such means as unreasona-
ble charges and withdrawal of living stipend of employee so as to block
the transfer. 20 3
Otsuka Pharmaceutical Company which was established in 1980 has
experienced the Chinese government's liberalization policy over the
years. In 1983 and 1984, the joint venture had to file many reports to
recruit workers, and was required to maintain a balance between the
number of female and male workers.2" In 1987, the report requirements
were relaxed, and the joint venture was only required to report the
number of workers recruited.2 °0 Currently, the joint venture recruits its
own workforce based on a written exam with the assistance of the Labor
Services Bureau.20 6 By recruiting in September, just after the results of
the university entrance examinations are announced, Otsuka has man-
aged to attract young candidates who are mostly senior high school grad-
uates.20 7 Recruiting recent graduates is advantageous because they do
not bring bad management practices into the joint venture since they
have not had an opportunity to work in local enterprises.20 8
Joint ventures now have greater latitude under the liberalized regu-
lations to search for skilled labor in their localities and in other localities.
This increased search area creates a larger labor pool from which they
may select workers.
198 See generally 1988 Labor Decisions, supra note 194; 1986 Labor Regulations, supra note
193; 1983 Labor Regulations, supra note 191.
199 See 1983 Labor Regulations, supra note 191; see also Beifing Tokyo Photographic Art Co.,
Ltd., supra note 160, at 12.
200 See 1983 Labor Regulations, supra note 191.
201 1986 Labor Regulations, supra note 193, art. (1)(b).
202 Id.
203 1988 Labor Decisions, supra note 194, art. 3.
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Some Chinese authorities have also taken the initiative to alleviate
the shortage of skilled labor. According to one report, the Beijing For-
eign Enterprise Service Corporation has made available a reserve of more
than 10,000 qualified workers from various professions to meet the needs
of resident offices of foreign firms in the capital, Beijing.209 In selecting
candidates, the Corporation claims to have paid attention not only to
foreign language abilities and technical skills, but also to the candidates'
moral character.210
Recruiting skilled labor should now be a lesser problem under the
law, and joint ventures, such as Otsuka Pharmaceutical Company, ap-
pear to have benefitted from the liberalized recruitment law.211 How-
ever, there is still some skepticism about the uniform implementation of
the law by government authorities. Some observers believe that the labor
regulations will be largely ignored by authorities, and recruitment of
skilled labor will continue to pose a problem. Further, Chinese law still
does not prohibit a venture's Chinese partner from pressuring the foreign
partner to accept its staffing "recommendations." The foreign partner
can minimize this problem and avoid having to confront its Chinese
counterpart by providing in the joint venture contract that all workers
must be recruited through a specified selection process, such as an exami-
nation. Where there are specific provisions on the selection process, it is
less likely that the Chinese partner will breach its contractual obligations
under the venture contract.
b. Senior Management
The recruitment of high-level personnel, such as general managers
and deputy general managers, is different from the recruitment of lesser
qualified workers. Recruitment of high level personnel is governed by
the Implementing Act which empowers the board of directors of a joint
venture to select senior management personnel.212
The qualifications and experience of senior management personnel
are the main concerns of foreign partners in a joint venture. For exam-
ple, according to one survey, "Chinese managers assigned to a joint ven-
ture traditionally come from the Communist Party, where title and rank
are more important than management skills. ' 21 3 This selection process
places low priority on merit and qualifications. For example, McDonnell
Douglas, a cooperative joint venture with the Chinese, found that their
209 Befling Recruits Personnel for Resident Offices of Foreign Firms, CHINA ECON. Nnws, Oct.
29, 1990, at 3.
210 Id.
211 See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
212 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 40.
213 Wagner, supra note 18, at 8.
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Chinese partner had to struggle to separate party and factory manage-
ment.2 14 The most qualified managers were not given authority simply
because they did not have party credentials.21 McDonnell Douglas fi-
nally threatened to halt production forcing senior management
changes.216 The process took more than six months, and the decision to
change senior management had to be approved by the Party Central
Committee.217
A solution to this problem is for the foreign partner to attempt to
incorporate a fixed selection procedure for high-level management per-
sonnel into its joint venture contract. Such a provision would avoid a
joint venture having to accept an incompetent general manager or deputy
general manager.
The transfer of high-level Chinese administrative staff has also been
a source of frustration to foreign investors. For example, after investing
time and effort in training administrative personnel, a joint venture may
be forced by the authorities to release them. The 1986 Labor Regula-
tions specifically addressed this issue by prohibiting government depart-
ments from transferring Chinese senior management personnel to other
jobs during their terms in office at the joint venture.21 8 If the personnel
must be transferred, the consent of the board of directors of the venture
must be obtained.219 The 1988 Labor Decisions required that, in addi-
tion to the consent of the board, of directors, the consent of the general
manager be obtained for such transfers. 220
2. Dismissal
Experience suggests that dismissing joint venture employees is very
difficult, especially dismissing employees provided by the Chinese part-
ner. Pursuant to the 1980 Labor Regulations, joint venture workers may
be dismissed in two situations. 22 ' First, if a worker has become "super-
fluous as a result of changes in production and technical conditions," he
or she may be dismissed.2 22 The dismissal can be made if the worker
cannot meet requirements after training, and is not suitable for other
work.223 The joint venture must compensate the dismissed worker ac-
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cording to the labor contract provisions.2 24 Second, a worker who vio-
lates the rules and regulations of a joint venture may be dismissed if the
violation is serious.225 The dismissal must be approved by the depart-
ment in charge of the joint venture and the labor management
department.22
6
In both cases, the labor union can file an objection to the dismissal
with the board of directors,227 and if the dispute cannot be resolved
through consultation, either party may request arbitration before the la-
bor authorities.228 If either party refuses to accept the arbitration award,
that party may file suit in a Chinese court.229 Because of the host of
provisions for approval and redress, foreign investors find that the dis-
missal of a joint venture employee is extremely difficult to enforce with-
out the agreement of the Chinese partner.230
In 1983, labor regulations were both liberalized and tightened in dif-
ferent respects. The procedure for dismissal was tightened so that the
joint venture must now simultaneously give one month's prior notice of
dismissal to the labor union and the worker.231 The procedure appears
to be liberalized in that the dismissal decision need only be submitted to
the department in charge of the venture, and to the local labor personnel
department.2 32 No approval is expressly required. 233 But limitations to
dismissals were also added. Workers cannot be dismissed during the pe-
riod of their treatment or recuperation from injury or illness, and women
cannot be dismissed during pregnancy or maternity leave.234
To further encourage foreign investments, the Twenty-two Articles
sanctioned the dismissal of workers who have become "redundant. 235
No prior notice is required. Filing a report with the local labor and per-
sonnel department is sufficient. 236 The 1986 Labor Regulations con-
tained similar provisions, except that filing of the dismissal was not
required.237  The trend toward liberalization of labor dismissal
224 Id.
225 Id. art. 5.
226 Id
227 Id art. 6.
2-28 Id. arts. 6, 14.
229 Id art. 14.
230 1983 Labor Regulations, supra note 191, arts. 7, 10.
231 Id. arts. 7, 10.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. art. 7.
235 Twenty-two Articles, supra note 117.
236 Id. Prior to this, a report also had to be filed with the department in charge of the joint
venture.
237 1986 Labor Regulations, supra note 193, art. (1)(d).
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culminated in the 1988 Labor Decisions.238 These decisions prohibited
government agencies, local enterprises, or individuals from interfering
with the decision of a joint venture to fire its Chinese employees so long
as such decisions were made according to the terms of the employment
contract and relevant regulations.
Notwithstanding legislative safeguards, the Warner Lambert joint
venture has come up with its own way to circumvent resistance to firing
workers.2 39 Each worker is required to read and sign a list of work regu-
lations approved by the trade union before working for the joint ven-
ture.24 When a worker is subsequently fired for breaking the rules,
neither the worker nor the trade union can complain.241 This agreement
has been successfully invoked at least four times by the joint venture.242
It would be beneficial for other foreign investors to also adopt such a
procedure.
3. Interference by the Bureaucracy
The Chinese bureaucracy has been known to interfere in the labor
management of joint ventures. The interference is usually carried out by
the department in charge of the Chinese partner ("Department"). Since
Departments have power over the recruitment and dismissal of workers
in Chinese enterprises, Departments often misconstrue this power to ex-
tend to joint ventures in which Chinese enterprises have an interest.
Joint ventures have self-governing power under the Implementing
Act,243 and the role of the Department is limited to providing "support
and assistance" to the ventures. 244 However, some Departments have
given a wide interpretation to the provision of "support and assistance"
to joint ventures, and some Departments simply ignore the autonomy of
joint ventures or are ignorant of the self-governing power of joint
ventures.
One example of this interference is found with Parker-Hubei. In
this situation, the Hubei Provincial Bureau of Machine Building Indus-
try245 "retired" two Chinese managers appointed by the joint venture
without the consent of the board of directors or knowledge of the Ameri-
can partner.246 The Bureau completely disregarded the self-governing
238 1988 Labor Decisions, supra note 194, art. 6.
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244 See Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 33.
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power of the joint venture and article 33 of the Joint Venture Law.24 7
Article 33 provides that the board of directors is the "highest authority"
in a joint venture and is vested with the power to decide all major is-
sues.248 The American partner protested the dismissal and threatened to
cancel transfers of technology from the parent company to the joint ven-
ture if the managers were not reinstated.249 Finally, the Bureau admitted
that it was ignorant of the law regarding joint ventures, and after pres-
sure from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and
MOFERT, rescinded their dismissal of the two managers.250 The
Parker-Hubei joint venture, however, still suffered losses as a result of
this incident.251
Similarly, in Salnan-Automotive Technical Service, a car mainte-
nance joint venture, China National Automotive Industry Corporation,
dismissed the chairman and all the directors of the joint venture without
notice to the foreign partners. 2  The foreign partners had to go to
China's top authorities before the chairman and directors were rein-
stated.25 3 The dispute lasted over a year.25 4
After many complaints and incidents, the State Council approved an
8-point opinion issued jointly by the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry
of Personnel.255 The opinion in part sought to alleviate bureaucratic in-
terference in joint ventures.256 The opinion, which is now embodied in
the 1988 Labor Decisions, places special emphasis on the autonomy of
foreign investment enterprises in the hiring and firing of Chinese person-
nel.257 Local governments and departments were directed to educate all
levels of leaders, workers, and staff members of the high degree of auton-
omy in personnel management accorded to joint ventures.258
The 1988 legislation is designed to deter future interference by the
bureaucracy, with administrative liability ensuing for those who breach
their obligations.259 The reality is that earlier legislation already afforded
some protection against such interference, but that did not prevent the
247 Id.
248 Id. See also Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 33.
249 Parker-Hube" Open Policy Defeats Bureaucracy, supra note 246.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Jardine Gets More than it Bargained for at Peking Car Service JV, 23 Bus. CHINA 177, 177.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 178.
255 New Law: Text and Analysis Ministries of Labor and Personnel, Further Implementing
Enterprises with Foreign Investment Autonomy in Employment Matters Opinion, CHINA L. PRAc.,
July 1988, at 18.
256 Id.
257 1988 Labor Decisions, supra note 194, art. 1.
258 Id. art. 9.
259 Id.
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bureaucracy from firing Chinese staff and workers employed by joint
ventures.2" As such, the 1988 legislation may be just another addition
to a host of ineffective laws which supposedly protect the autonomy of
joint ventures.
D. Inadequate Infrastructure
Foreign investment in China is also hampered by the country's inad-
equate infrastructure. This poor infrastructure is exemplified by power
shortages, a poor transportation system, and a poor communications
system.
The Chinese authorities are aware of the country's over-burdened
and inadequate infrastructure, and have attempted to address these
problems. For example, the Twenty-two Articles give priority to export
enterprises and technologically-advanced enterprises in obtaining water
and power service, and transportation and communication facilities
needed for production and distribution.261
1. Power Shortages
The power supply in China is notorious for being inadequate and
unreliable. Sino-foreign joint ventures have experienced varying degrees
of inconvenience caused by the inadequate supply and have adapted. For
example, Stoody-Shanghai is not able to run its plant at full capacity
because the amount of power allocated to the joint venture is inade-
quate.262 To compound the problem, the power supply is also erratic,
and the plants have to close down parts of their operation periodically.2 63
Parker-Hubei is more fortunate, as power is available six days a week to
the joint venture for most of the year. 64 But power supply is curtailed in
summers, when floods and droughts reduce the electricity supply.26
Municipal needs are given priority over the needs of Parker-Hubei, and
the plant can only operate four days a week during the summer.2 66 Ap-
parently, the joint venture either does not qual as a priority venture
under the Twenty-two Articles, or the local authorities are simply ignor-
ing the law.
Fu-Wan Toy Company, a Sino-Japanese joint venture, accommo-
260 See, e.g., Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 7 (joint ventures have self-governing
power).
261 Twenty-two Articles, supra note 117, art. 5.
262 The Stoody JV Part 2: Marketing, Pricing, Other Operating Issues, 13 Bus. CHINA 185, 186
(1987).
263 Id.
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dates the vagaries of power supply by closing its plants on Wednes-
days.267 However, there have been instances where authorities also cut
off power supply on Thursdays, informing the company of the power cut
only on the same morning.261 Beijing-Tokyo, on the other hand, has not
allowed its operations to be hampered by power shortages.269 Initially, it
continued to operate its photo processing laboratory and photographic
shop by candlelight when power was cut.270 When the authorities pro-
hibited business by candlelight, the venture used pocket flashlights or got
by with window light.271
To minimize the inconvenience of power curtailments, foreign inves-
tors should attempt, during venture negotiations, to obtain a contractual
commitment by the relevant authorities to provide the requisite power to
the venture. This commitment may be hard to extract, as local authori-
ties may be inexperienced and unable to appreciate the needs of joint
ventures. For example, the Hainan authorities required Coca Cola-Hal-
nan to pre-pay 1.2 million renminbi for the establishment of a power line
and substation, but refused to contract or guarantee to supply the power
needed.272
If it is any comfort to foreign investors, the power-supply problem
extends beyond joint venture operations. In October 1984 the Govern-
ment reported that 20% of the country's machinery stood idle because of
energy shortages. The shortages were most serious in Shanghai, China's
biggest industrial center, and in nine eastern provinces, including many
special economic zone port cities.273
2. Poor Transportation System
China is also plagued by a poor transportation system both on land
and sea. The waterways are used as the primary mode to transport
goods, but the major ports are relatively shallow and extremely con-
gested. Ships must often wait weeks or months for loading berths. Many
of China's roads are unpaved, making road transportation a nightmare.
At Thurmond-Shanghai, foreign personnel reported having to drive
through streams to get to Wuhan to collect materials.2 74
Printronics-Guangzhou has also complained about air transporta-
267 China Fu-Wan Toy Company, Ltd., CHINA NEWSL., no. 75, at 18.
268 Id.
269 Beling Tokyo Photographic Art Co., Ltd., supra note 160, at 11.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Coca-Cola's New Hainan Venture, supra note 92, at 27.
273 Alison Lisa Patrucco, Equity Joint Ventures with the People's Republic of China: A Puzzle in
Politics, Law and Tradition, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 609, 638 (1987).
274 Webber, supra note 146, at 24.
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tion in China.275 The joint venture sells its printed circuit boards mainly
to end-users in Europe, the U.S., and Singapore. Most of the product is
air freighted.276 In one case, the venture suffered a costly delay of 3 days
to a week because it used the busy Shanghai-Hong Kong air freight
route.
277
3. Poor Communications System
Telephones are scarce and expensive in China, and the telecommu-
nications infrastructure is ill-equipped to serve the vast country. For ex-
ample, Stoody-Shanghai has reported that it takes hours to get through
to the country's national operator to make overseas calls, despite the
joint venture's location in Jianding, the satellite "scie:ce city" in
Shanghai.278
E. Poor Quality Control
Joint ventures cannot sell their products overseas if the products do
not meet international quality standards. Many ventures have problems
exporting their products because of poor quality. This is especially true
in the initial years of a venture's operation. Poor quality is usually the
result of poor-quality inputs and/or indifference of the joint venture
workers and the input prodution workers to quality control.
As discussed above, Chinese workers have no regard for the produc-
tion of high-quality products, largely because of China's centrally-
planned quota system, which only rewards the ability to produce the al-
located quota. Quality of the product is irrelevant so long as the quota is
met. Chinese workers naturally carry over their poor work habits from
the quota system to the joint venture.
Joint ventures use different methods to rectify the problem. Prin-
tronics-Guangzhou tries to improve the quality of its multi-layered
printed circuit boards by making quality checks at three different places
along the production line.2 79 Twenty-two technicians have also been sent
for four months of training at the parent company's plant in Australia,
and these technicians in turn have trained other workers on their return
to China.28 0 Workers are also required to attend classes at the plant
every day. 281
Volkswagen-Shanghai has a different approach to improving qual-
275 Australia Firm Uses PRC Venture as Lesson for Other Asian Projects, supra note 115, at 10.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 The Stoody JV, Part 2: Marketing Pricing, Other Operating Issues, supra note 262, at 186.
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ity. The workers at the joint venture were divided into small groups of
five to six people and are supervised by a foreman."' 2 Each group is
responsible for the quality of the products it manufactures, and a worker
may be removed from his group as punishment if he fails to comply with
quality standards.283
An arms-length approach has been adopted by McDonnell Douglas
to solve the problem. This approach is possible here because McDonnell
Douglas has a licensing agreement, and not a joint venture, with Shang-
hai Aviation Industrial Corporation.28 o First, the contract provides that
the Federal Aviation Authority ("FAA") is the final authority on quality
inspection; that is, the FAA certifies or rejects all planes made in
China.2"' Second, the FAA designees work in China to assure compli-
ance with the U.S. regulations.28 6
However, the appointment of an independent third party as the final
authority on quality may not be acceptable or feasible in most joint ven-
ture situations. It entails additional costs and time to meet the inspection
requirements, and the Chinese partner may not be open to leaving the
final decision to a third party.
Whatever the approach that foreign investors decide to adopt for
quality control, the system should be devised early in the joint venture
negotiations, and be included in the joint venture contract to prevent
resistance at the operation stage.
F. Termination
The relationship between the Chinese partner and the foreign part-
ner in a joint venture may be terminated in two ways: the transfer of one
partner's interest in the venture to a third party or to the remaining part-
ner; or the dissolution of the joint venture.
Chinese law covers the second situation, but only partially provides
for the first situation. The Joint Venture Law and the Implementing Act
provide for the assignment of one partner's interest to a third party.287
The law is silent on the more obvious alternative of the remaining part-
ner buying out the outgoing partner's interest in the joint venture.
1. Buy-outs
There are three possible scenarios for a joint venture buy-out: (a)
the Chinese partner buys the foreign partner's interest; (b) the foreign
282 Joint Venture Report - Shanghai Volkswagen, supra note 56, at 37-38.
283 Id.
284 McDonnell Douglas Airplane Licensing Agreement, supra note 214, at 26.
285 IaL at 27-28.
286 Id. at 28.
287 See Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 4; Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 23.
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partner buys the Chinese partner's interest; or (c) a third partner buys
either the Chinese or foreign partner's or both partners' interest in the
venture.
There is generally no specific provision for a straight buy-out of one
partner's interest in a joint venture by the remaining partner. However,
there is a buy-out provision that can be invoked when one partner at-
tempts to assign its interest in the venture to a third party.2 8 Here, the
remaining partner to the joint venture has the preemptive right to
purchase the divesting partner's share.289 The consent of the examina-
tion and approval authority is required for such purchase.290
The issue remains whether one partner may directly buy out the
other partner's interest in a joint venture. It would be anomalous for the
Chinese authorities to object to a straight buy-out of the remaining part-
ner's interest on the ground that there is no express provision for such a
buy-out. The objection can easily be circumvented by first offering to
assign the interest to a third party, thereby triggering the right of pre-
emption vested in the remaining partner. In this circuitous manner, a
buy-out by the remaining partner may be achieved. It is likely that if the
Chinese authorities do object to a direct buy-out of a venture partner's
interest, it will probably be for reasons other than the absence of legisla-
tive provision for such a buy-out.
In practice, the absence of express legislative provisions has not
proved to be an obstacle to direct buy-outs by the Chinese partner.291
Last December, UNISOL, the foreign partner, was reported as negotiat-
ing with its Chinese partner to sell out the former's share in the
UNISOL-Guangdong joint venture to the Chinese partner.292 On the
other hand, the buy-out of a Chinese partner's interest by the foreign
partner would have been impossible before 1986, since there was no pro-
vision for wholly foreign-owned enterprises before 1986. With the pas-
sage of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprises on April 12, 1986, this obstacle was removed.293
According to one report, despite the dearth of legislation on buy-
outs, joint venture parties have included:
clauses in their joint venture contracts [providing] for... voluntary,
negotiated, buy-out[s] by either party, or for mandatory buy-outs but
288 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 4; Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 23.
289 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 4; Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 23.
290 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 4; Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 23.
291 United Aerosol and Home Products Company, CHINA L. PRAc., Dec. 10, 1990, at 20; See
also Helena K. Kolenda, Note A Happy Ending: Buy-out in Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, 24
TEXAS INT'L L. J. 87, 93 n.42 (1989).
292 United Aerosol and Home Products Company, supra note 291, at 20.
293 The Law of the People's Republic of China on Whole Foreign Owned Enterprises (promul-
gated by the State Council on Apr. 12, 1986) (WESTLAW, Intlaw library, Chinalaw file).
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the latter type of buy-out is rarely included as a provision. In either
case, a buy-out... must be approved by the [Chinese] government
authority which approved the original joint venture contract.294
The same report mentions that in the early 1980's, voluntary buy-out
provisions were approved within joint venture contracts on an irregular
basis. More recently, however, buy-outs appear to have gained the
grudging acceptance of MOFERT.29 5
It is in a joint venture's interest to provide for buy-outs in case the
partners do not get along but the termination of the joint venture's opera-
tion is not economically feasible at that stage. This is true especially
when one partner is very interested in carrying on with the venture alone.
The buy-out clauses should provide for: (1) the valuation of assets; (2)
the inclusion of goodwill as an asset; (3) the payment for the foreign
party's interest in foreign currency; (4) the inclusion of foreign lawyers or
accountants in the valuation process; and (5) the submission of the mat-
ter to an independent third party for determination in case of
disagreement.2 96
2. Dissolution
The law2 9 7 permits a joint venture to be terminated prior to its natu-
ral expiration date in the following circumstances:
(1) The joint venture is unable to continue operations because of:
heavy losses; the failure of one party to fulfil its obligations; 298 or
heavy losses caused by force majeure.
(2) The joint venture is unable to achieve the objects of the venture
and the plans for future development;
(3) Other reasons for termination, as provided for in the joint venture
contract have occurred.
The termination must be agreed upon299 by all parties to the joint
venture, and sanctioned by the original approving authority for the joint
venture. 3 ' ° The termination must also be registered with the relevant
294 Joe Simone, Alternatives to Liquidation, CHINA L. PRAc., June 11, 1990, at 22. See also
Note A Happy Ending: Buy-out in Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, supra note 291, at 103.
295 Simone, supra note 294, at 23.
296 Some approved clauses are vague, providing only that parties negotiate the purchase price
in good faith. Other clauses provide for payment in addition to the book value of the joint venture at
some fixed percentage of the book value. Still others are more complex, setting out a formula based
on the net worth of the joint venture. See Kolenda, supra note 291, at 103.
297 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 13; Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 102. The
Joint Venture Law uses the word "terminate" while the Implementing Act uses the word "dissolve."
Both words read in context are synonymous.
298 The party in breach of its obligations bears the losses ensuing from such breach. Joint
Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 13; Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 102.
299 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 13.
300 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 102.
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state departments. 30 1 It is apparent from the agreement and approval
requirements that there can be no unilateral termination of a joint
venture.
Despite the legislative provisions 0 z on joint venture termination, it
is in the interest of the parties to reiterate the law in the joint venture
contract and articles of association. The circumstances under which a
venture may be dissolved should be clarified to minimize dispute over
their interpretation. For example, heavy losses, inability of the joint ven-
ture to achieve its objectives, and force majeure should be defined, or a
third party should be nominated to determine whether the specified
events have occurred.
After the parties have agreed to terminate the joint venture and the
requisite approvals have been obtained, the parties must go through a
series of steps to liquidate the venture. First, the parties must execute an
agreement for the termination of the joint venture.30 3 The reasons for
termination must be set forth in the agreement, and must be approved by
the original authority that approved the joint venture contract.3 4
Second, after the termination agreement has been approved, the
board of directors must announce the dissolution of the venture.305 The
board works out the procedures and principles for the liquidation, and
establishes a liquidation committee.30 6 The members of the committee
consist of directors of the joint venture, lawyers, and accountants. 30 7
The lawyers and accountants must be registered in China. 30 8 The com-
mittee represents the joint venture during the liquidation process and can
sue and be sued.3 °9
The committee is entrusted with the tasks of compiling an inventory
of the joint venture's assets and liabilities, and of formulating a plan for
liquidation.31 0 The plan must be ratified by the board of directors31 and
implemented under the supervision of the local Administration for In-
dustry and Commerce.312 "The Administration enjoys the power to
overrule the decisions of the liquidation committee regarding the sale of
assets and the distribution of proceeds where the result of such commit-
301 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 13.
302 Id.
303 Id. art. 103.
304 Id.
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tee decisions would be unfair. ' 313
Finally, after the venture's debts are cleared, the remaining prop-
erty, if any, may be distributed to the parties according to the proportion
of each party's contributions, or by some other method agreed upon be-
tween the parties.314 When the affairs of the venture have been wound
up, the venture must be de-registered, and the business license must be
cancelled. 315 To give the public notice of the termination and liquidation
of the joint venture, advertisements must placed in newspapers within
the locality where the venture carried on business.316
III. CONCLUSION
More than a decade has passed since the initial Sino-foreign joint
ventures were established in China under the Joint Venture Law. Many
problems were encountered by foreign investors in the early 1980's, and
most of the same problems are still being experienced today. To be fair,
many laws have been promulgated to address foreign investors' concerns,
the latest being the Twenty-two Articles. 317 But it is apparent that legis-
lation alone cannot eradicate foreign investors' problems in China. In-
stead, government policy, the bureaucracy, and the business culture and
attitude of the Chinese people play an equal, if not more important, part
in eradicating foreign investment problems.
Government policy sometimes plays a more important role in the
area of foreign exchange availability. For example, joint ventures have to
generate the hard currency they need because of the inconvertibility of
the renminbi, and the hard currency shortage in China. The solution to
the foreign exchange problem does not rest in legislation alone. Instead,
the solution is inextricably tied to the policies of the Chinese government
at any given time. For example, in AMC-Beijing, the Chinese govern-
ment had agreed to sell foreign exchange to the venture, presumably pur-
suant to the Implementing Act.318 This permits ventures to purchase
hard currency from Chinese government authorities. Because of an im-
port growth, China's foreign exchange reserves plunged by more than
$11 billion in 1985, causing the government to drastically restrict hard
currency expenditure. As a result of the belt-tightening policy, the gov-
ernment in 1986 refused to provide the hard currency which it had previ-
ously agreed to sell to the venture. This incident indicates that
313 Practice Notes Liquidation of Joint Ventures, CHINA L. PRAc., Mar. 28, 1988, at 26-27.
314 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 106.
315 Id. art. 107.
316 Practice Notes: Liquidation of Joint Ventures, supra note 313, at 27.
317 See Twenty-two Articles, supra note 117 (the promulgation date was Oct. 11, 1986).
318 Implementing Act, supra note 21, art. 75.
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government policies play a more important role than existing legislation
or commitments.
The bureaucracy, on the other hand, plays an important role in la-
bor management problems. Despite a host of legislation granting auton-
omy in the management of joint ventures, local bureaucrats are either
ignorant of the existence of the legislation, or they simply ignore the leg-
islation. Instead, they take matters into their own hands. For, example,
in Parker-Hubei, the bureaucrats in charge of the Chinese partner in the
venture were generally suspicious of foreign investors, and regarded the
venture as a "colonial enterprise." This general suspicion spilled over to
the Chinese managers who were running the venture. The managers
were accused of "championing foreigners." As a result of the ill-feelings
harbored by the bureaucrats, the bureaucrats removed the Chinese man-
agers from office in the joint venture without notification or consent of
the foreign partners. The removal of Chinese personnel took place de-
spite the existence of legislation granting autonomy to joint venture oper-
ations. The bureaucrats later pleaded ignorance to legislation granting
autonomy in joint venture management.
It is, therefore, not surprising that there is great skepticism about
the effectiveness of the 1988 Labor Decisions in preventing future bu-
reaucratic "meddling" in joint ventures. Although the 1988 Labor Deci-
sions emphasize the autonomy of joint ventures and the education of
local leaders on the existence of such autonomy, there is a general per-
ception that Chinese bureaucrats' predisposition to ignore the law and
their general suspicion of foreign investments may prevail over the
legislation.
Finally, in the areas of local sourcing and poor quality control of the
venture's products, the central command system of the Chinese govern-
ment economy is responsible for the foreign investors' problems, not the
dearth in regulations. Most of China's existing workforce is accustomed
to the quota system under which quantity and not quality is the indicator
of success. Under the central planning system, as long as Chinese enter-
prises produce the quota assigned under the state plan, they have dis-
charged their obligation. No reward is given for quality products and no
penalties are imposed for shoddy quality. It is, therefore almost impossi-
ble for joint ventures to source quality materials locally and to produce
quality products in China without re-educating the workforce about the
virtues of quality products. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to educating
the workforce is the continued existence of the central planning system in
China today. The workers have to be quality-oriented at the joint ven-
ture where they work, but outside their workplace they have to comply
with the nation's central planning system which governs all other aspects
of their lives. The workers have to learn to adapt to the dual system that
exists side by side in China.
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Despite the existence and recurrence of the same problems in for-
eign investment in China after more than one decade, investors seem to
have endless faith in the Chinese economy. According to a survey, more
than 50% of the joint ventures examined still have hopes that their ven-
ture problems will be solved in the next two to three years.3" It is hard
to imagine the source of their hopes since the Chinese government has
tried over ten years and still has not succeeded in solving the investors'
problems. Perhaps, these investors view the Chinese government's at-
tempts to solve their problems as a light at the end of the tunnel. At least
the government is aware of their problems and is willing to address them,
albeit unsuccessfully. Or perhaps, the foreign investors are just blinded
by their dreams to capture the world's largest potential consumer market
in China.
319 Wagner, supra note 18, at 11.

